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In  order  for  Jamaica  to  transition  from  a  Developing  Country  to  a 
Developed  Country  it  will  be  highly  necessary  to  create  a  Knowledge 
based society, the inability to seriously overcome this challenge will mean 
Jamaica will be in transition to a developed country for an infinite number 
of years. 
 
A  lifelong  learning  framework  encompasses  learning  throughout  the 
lifecycle, from early childhood through retirement. It encompasses formal 
learning  (schools,  training  institutions,  universities);  non-formal  learning 
(structured on-the job training); and informal learning (skills learned from 
family members or people in the community). It allows people to access 
learning opportunities, as they need them rather than because they have 
reached a certain age. 
Lifelong learning in Jamaica is an important policy topic for government. 
This assumption is based on the impact of additional training on economic 
growth and on income distribution, particularly in an age when previously 
acquired knowledge is depreciating faster than before. 
 
Using  the  Palacios  (2003)  framework  we  examine  different  education 
financing  mechanisms,  that  could  be  examined  by  the  Government  of 
Jamaica  (GOJ)  in  light  of  the  particular  characteristics  of  lifelong 
learning.   7
 
The  framework  compares  the  different  financing  alternatives  on  four 
dimensions: (1) who ultimately pays for the education, (2) who finances its 
immediate costs, (3) how payments are made, and (4) who collects the 
payments. 
 
The  characteristics  are  that  the  individual  should  (1)  decide  what  and 
where to study, (2) carry a significant part of the financial burden, and (3) 
be encouraged to continue learning through all life stages. 
 
The financing alternatives are analyzed according to who ultimately pays 
for the education. 
Cost-recovery 
 
 Traditional loans,  
 A graduate tax,  
 Human Capital Contracts and  




 Those in which the state directly subsidizes institutions 
 State gives vouchers to students. 
 
The analysis concludes that combining Income-Contingent Loans and 
Human Capital Contracts with vouchers is the most efficient and equitable 
method for financing lifelong learning.   8
 
Shifting  towards  cost  recovery  alternatives,  focusing  on  collection  of 
payments and aiming for the involvement of private capital are assessed as 
key issues that should be addressed to ensure that lifelong learning will be 
available for all equitably and efficiently. 
 
Government (GOJ) Framework for Analyzing Alternatives 
in Financing Lifelong Learning. 
 
It is convenient to develop a framework to better understand the 
differences between options for financing education. The following 
framework analyzes each instrument according to the following 
dimensions:  
(1)  Who ultimately pays for education,  
(2)  Who provides the financing,  
(3)  Who collects the payments, and  
(4)  What financing mechanism is used. Each of them is explained in 
more detail below 
 
Who ultimately pays for the financing? 
 
This dimension of education financing asks who ends up paying for 
education costs over a lifetime. It should not be confused with who pays at 
the point of use, which is part of the initial financial arrangements. Major 
parties involved in the financing of education are:  
(1)  The state,  
(2)  Employers,    9
(3)  Other private entities, and  
(4)  Students and close relations. 
 
State provides funds for education 
 
This arrangement is not considered the best for two main reasons:  
(1)  It is inequitable and  
(2)  States simply do not have enough resources to cover the demand 
for education. 
 When the state provides most of the funds this is inequitable 
because they use society￿s resources for an investment where 
the individual is the main beneficiary.  
 The second limitation is a consequence of constrained national 
budgets combined with increasing demand for education 
services. 
The way in which the state makes its contributions is relevant given the 
economic results it generates. There are two possibilities:  
(1)  The state gives the resources to institutions, also known as 
supply-side financing, or  





A  second  source  of  funding  comes  from  employers.  They  benefit  from 
having  access  to  an  educated  workforce  and  should  thus  be  willing  to   10
compensate  for  this  benefit.  They  can  also  benefit  themselves  s  by 
receiving knowledge from educational institutions. 
 
 
Regarding  the  benefit  of  an  educated  workforce,  Becker￿s  (1993) 
analysis  shows  that  employers  will  only  be  willing  to  cover  the 
costs  of  education  and  training  when  the  student  acquires 
particular  skills  that  cannot  be  transferable  to  other  jobs. 




This  will  come  from  such  entities  as  NGOs  and  religious  0rganizations. 
These  entities  invest  resources  in education without seeking a monetary 
return on their investment. They constitute many of the grants available for 
students  and  are  usually  directed  at  students  in  need  of  financial  aid. 
However, the resources that society can spend on education without any 
expected return are limited, and these organizations will never be able to 
provide all the funding required to meet the increasing demand for higher 




This  arrangement  is  equitable  because  the  student  is  the  greatest 
beneficiary of additional training received; it is efficient because students 
then have an economic incentive to shop around for the best educational 
institution to spend their money on, creating competition among schools. 




It is virtually impossible to arrive at an ideal combination of all of these 
sources. 
 
 On one hand, theory suggests that a system completely state funded 
(no student fees) is not equitable. 
 
 Some  funding  is  required  to attract certain groups who have been 
systematically marginalized from education opportunities. 
 
Any solution will have to consider the constraints of the state for funding 
education but must not deny its important role in promoting equal 
opportunities in education. 
 
Who Finances Education 
 
Who  provides  the  immediate  funding  for  education  at  the  point  of  use? 
This question is relevant because it is current resources, not future ones, 
which  allow  institutions  to  function  on  an  everyday  basis.  Thus,  the 
principle that students should pay for education should be combined with 
the principle that education should not require payments at the point of 
use. If payments are demanded from the student, only students who have 
resources before studying will be able to pay the costs of the investment. 
Upfront financing of education is key to making students pay for education 
without harming access to disadvantaged groups. 
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The major sources for the financing of education are  
(1)  The private financial sector,  
(2)  The state, and  
(3)  Students. 
 
Private sector financing 
 
This should enable investment in education in an efficient market. 
 
Other  possibilities  are  the  educational  institutions  themselves  and 
employers. Financial instruments are as follows: 
 Private loans,  
 Human Capital Contracts and  
 Income-contingent loans 
 
Unfortunately,  the  education  market  is  not  efficient,  and thus relying on 
the private sector alone to provide the funds for education is not feasible, 
at least while the inefficiencies are not addressed. 
However, the involvement of private sector financing in education, even if 
only partially, is fundamental for its expansion. 
State Financing 
Under  this  arrangement  the  state  provides  the  resources  initially,  but 
expects the student to ultimately pay. The most prominent examples are 
public student loans, including some income-contingent loans, and the 
graduate tax. The use of the state for financing education is a response to 
the lack of private funding for education. However, current budgetary  
   13
 
 
constraints do not allow governments to meet the increased demands for 
higher and continuing education. 
Student Financing 
The student, and as an extension, his or her family. This alternative is the 
only one available when the others are not, denying access to higher and 
continuing education to the student who does not have the resources to 




The financing arrangement between the funding agency (state, private, 
etc.) and the individual can take many different forms. The following 





Although they are the most straightforward mechanism for making 
capital available, they are not a good alternative for financing education. 
The  most  common  type,  also  called  mortgage-type,  expects  students  to 
pay a fixed amount each period, typically per month, for a certain amount 
of time. The main problems with this kind of loan are that it does not adapt 
to the needs of the student and leaves lenders with little protection against 
default. 
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One  way  to  adapt  loans  to  the  needs  of  students  is  to  match  required 
payments  with  the  student￿s capacity to pay. The simplest solution is to 
create a schedule in which payments increase according to how a student￿s 
income  is  supposed  to  increase.  This  particular  kind  of  loan  is  called  a 
graduated loan. The next step in making loans more accessible to 
students  is  to  provide  additional  flexibility  to  take  into  account  special 
circumstances such as unemployment, further training, or periods of low- 
income. Ideally, payments  could be made at the discretion of the student, 
almost like credit card payments. 
However,  flexibility  requires  a  price  and  presumably  a  more  flexible 
instrument  would  become  more  expensive  for  students.  Also,  complete 
flexibility might not be realistic as this may encourage defaults, making the 
system unsustainable. Nevertheless, additional flexibility as a solution for 
private  education  financing  has  been  identified  as  key  to  improving  the 
options for students. 
 
Equity Financing   
 
 
As far back as 1955 economist Milton Friedman suggested equity financing, 
the  method  used  for  investing  in  high-risk  investments,  as  a  possible 
approach to financing education. This arrangement compensates investors 
by allowing them a possibility of higher returns for the higher risk they take 
on when financing students. This kind of financing would demand from a 
student a percentage of his or her income during a specific period of time. 
Such an instrument is a Human Capital Contract. 




An intermediate approach between loans and equity- like investments has 
been gaining popularity since the 1970s: income-contingent loans. 
These loans combine the flexibility of Human Capital Contracts with the 
fixed-obligation characteristic of loans. 
 
Who Collects Payments 
 
The experience of payment collections in countries with publicly collected 
income  contingent  loans,  such  as  in  Australia,  and  in  countries  where 
private  entitlements  are  collected  along  with  taxes,  such  as  the  private 
pension fund in Chile; open up the possibility for combining different kinds 
of financing with two main collection methods: 
 Private collection of payments is what banks use to collect their 
debts. 
 Public collection uses existing institutions, such as taxing authorities, 
to collect education payments. 
 
Requires very different degrees of participation from the state. In the case 
of private collection, the state need only enforce contracts. In contrast, in 
the  case  of  public  collection  the  state  enforces  law  into  its  collection 
mechanism and also uses its tax collection agency to enforce payments. 
Public  collection  of  payments  is  relevant  because  it  provides  a  cost-
effective  way  of  collecting  payments  from  students,  using  the  already 
existing state machinery. 
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General Requirements of an Education Financing Scheme 
 
(1)  Equitable access, 
(2)  Impact On the education market, and  




A  solution  for  financing  education  should  aim  at  making  education 
accessible to anybody who has the capacity and will to undergo additional 
training. Any other arrangement, such as one that might detract individuals 
with low-incomes from participating, would create a situation in which only 
better-off individuals can continue to improve their skills (a situation which 
is observed today). Such an arrangement would not be equitable for those 




Different policies have different impacts on the behavior of the education 
market.  Following  the  classic  economic  model,  policies  for  financing 
education  should  aim  to  enhance  the  choices  available  to  potential 
students, increase the information available to help them decide on what 
course  to take and what institutions to attend, and increase competition 
between educational institutions. 
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Impact on the labor market 
 
The impact of a particular policy on the labor market should be taken into 
account, since the performance of the economy is one of the reasons why 
education is considered important. The impact of different schemes can be 
studied by analyzing the effect that particular repayment methods have on 
the decisions individuals make when deciding where to work. For instance, 
Oosterbeek  (1998)  discusses  the  possible  effect  that  income-contingent 
payments might have when an individual chooses whether to work or not, 
and what levels of income to seek. He concludes that these arrangements 
may produce a disincentive for the individual to work. The possible welfare 
costs that this generates should thus be considered when evaluating the 
use of income-contingent payments. 
Lifelong Learning Financing Requirements 
 
At  this  point  it  is  relevant  to  ask  why  the  financing  of  lifelong  learning 
should be different from that of other kinds of education. Lifelong learning 
is defined here as the learning that takes place after primary, secondary 
and tertiary levels, even if the student did not actually go through these 
levels. The differences between these stages of learning are the foundation 
for the following principles:  
 First,  lifelong  learning  should  be  mostly  privately  financed  and 
pursued;  
 Second, some kind of government intervention and financial support 
is required to target marginalized groups and to take account of  
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externalities; and  
 Third, the actual provision of lifelong learning should remain in 





A proposal that seeks to promote lifelong learning should not discriminate 
against particular kinds of learning, and against particular ages or periods 
of  life  for  which  it  should  be  undertaken.  A  proposal  that  favors  age 
groups,  or  experience  groups,  will  defeat  the  purpose  of  enhancing 
opportunities for additional training throughout a lifetime. 
 
1. The individual should be responsible for deciding what additional 
training to pursue and when to continue training. 
2. The individual should also carry most of the financial burden. 
3. The system should be equitable. Government can use subsidies to 
attract students from marginalized backgrounds. 
4. Government has an important role regulating the provision of 
education. 
5. The system should promote efficiency in the education market. 
6. The system should promote efficiency in the labor market. 
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Government  Policy  Options  for  Financing  Lifelong 
Learning 
In  the  previous  section  we  discussed  the  principles  that  a  system  for 
financing  lifelong  learning  should  follow  and  exploring  the  framework 
through  which  different  policies  will  be  analyzed,  this  section analyzes a 
wide  variety  of  instruments  for  financing  education  and  provides  a 
recommendation as to the feasibility of each one in light of the principles 
discussed in the previous section. 
 
Two distinct kinds of alternatives are presented:  
(1)  Those where the student is expected to pay for at least part of the 
cost of education, also known as cost-recovery schemes, and  
(2)  Those where government pays for education.  
 
This  division  corresponds  to  the  fundamental  difference  in  objectives 
between these alternatives. One focuses on the mechanism used to make 
students pay for their education and the other focuses on the best way in 




Cost-recovery schemes expect that the student pays for at least part of the 
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Cost-recovery  is  equitable  because  it  asks  those  who  benefit  from 
education  to  pay  for  it.  Individuals  are  the  primary  beneficiaries  of 
education,  enjoying  higher  average  earnings  after  graduation  than  they 
would earn otherwise. On the other hand, cost-recovery strategies always 
raise concerns regarding the potential harm to access they can cause. The 
concern is that if cost-recovery schemes are not introduced carefully, they 
can  marginalize  low-income  students  from  the  possibility  of  obtaining 
additional education. 
 
Four cost recovery instruments will be examined: 
 
(1)  Traditional loans,  
(2)  Human Capital Contracts (HCCs),  
(3)  Graduate tax and  





Traditional mortgage-type loans provide the easiest arrangement for 
financing education. They operate in the same way as other loans, 
requiring fixed payments for a specific period of time. The amount that 
students have to pay each period, typically each month, depends on the 
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Advantages 
 
The main advantages of traditional mortgage-type loans are its simplicity 
and the existing knowledge about them. Traditional mortgage-type loans 
are  probably  the  most  basic  financial  instrument  used  to  satisfy  cash 
needs.  They  are  also  widely  used  and  understood.  Thus,  implementing 
mortgage-type loans is probably relatively easy from a policymaker￿s point 
of view. From an investment point of view, the knowledge that investors 




Unfortunately,  mortgage-type  loans  have  several  weaknesses when used 
for financing education.  
 First,  education  is  an  intangible  asset  that  cannot  be  used  as 
collateral, thus the risk for the lender increases. The absence of 
collateral  typically  results  in  mortgage  type  loans  being  offered 
only  to  families  who  have  enough  assets  to  serve  as  collateral, 
precisely those who need financial aid the least.  
 Second,  the  returns  to  investments  in  education  are  wide,  with 
some obtaining high returns while others struggling to maintain an 
income level high enough to pay the debt. Students cannot know 
with  certainty  before  investing  in  their  education  that  their 
investment will allow them to repay their debt comfortably. This 
problem is exasperated by the inflexibility of the payment schedule 
of traditional loans. 
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Human Capital Contracts (HCC) 
 
Human  Capital  Contracts  have  been  proposed  as a viable alternative for 
financing  education  in  recent  years.  Originally  proposed  as  a  financial 
alternative  for  education  by  Milton  Friedman  (1945  and  1955),  the  idea 
behind  Human  Capital  Contracts  provided the basis for the graduate tax 
and for income-contingent loans. During the 1960s and 1970s these two 
variations  became  more  popular, and Human Capital Contracts were not 
considered again until the early 1990s as a viable option. 
 
A Human Capital Contract (HCC) is a contract in which a student commits 
part of his future earnings for a fixed period of time in exchange for capital 
for financing education. 
The main parameters required to design a Human Capital Contracts are the 
percentage  of  income  and  the  repayment  period.  The  instrument  works 




(1)  They decrease the risk of the investment to the student, they are 
equitable, and  
(2)  They can offer a measure of the expected value of 
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Weaknesses 
 
Human Capital Contracts have several implementation limitations. The 
most relevant are 
(1)  The capacity to determine information accurately from the 
individual,  
(2)  The phenomenon of adverse selection and  




A graduate tax would tax each graduate for having attended college. Thus, 
each  student  would  end  up  paying  a  percentage  of  their  income 




The graduate tax shares with HCCs the advantages of  
(1)  Lowering the risk that students face in their lifelong earnings,  
(2)  Lowering risk of defaulting on payments due to financial distress, 
and  




(1)  For the graduate tax to work, a state-collection agency has to 
have the ability to determine graduates￿ incomes and to collect the 
tax from them. In the absence of a state-collection agency, a 
national insurance system, or a social security system can aid in   24
determining income. However, without any of these, the amount 
that can be recovered might be very low. 
 
(2)  A graduate tax cannot be levied when the individual emigrates. 
 
(3)  A third problem with the graduate tax is the adverse selection that 
it generates among individuals with different levels of ability. In 
particular, a graduate tax taxes all earnings equally, without 
discriminating between earnings due to additional education and 
those due to other factors, such as ability or occupation industry. 
(4)  A fourth drawback of the graduate tax is its inability to create 
immediate resources for funding education. 
(5)  Finally, the percentage of income that will represent the graduate 
tax will be the result of a political process, rather than something 
that reflects the value of education n. To start, in order to 
accurately reflect the expected value of education, the tax would 
have to be different for individuals attending different schools and 




The last income-contingent repayment scheme that is discussed here is the 
income contingent loan (ICL). An ICL collects a percentage of income from 
a graduate until the value of the loan has been repaid or until a maximum 
repayment period has been reached. Income-contingent loans have been 
the most publicized new instrument for financing education and there has    25
 
been a growing bibliography that supports them. As a result of this, several 
countries have implemented income-contingent repayment schemes. 
 
The main parameters of ICLs are:  
(1)  The interest rate,  
(2)  The repayment period,  
(3)  The percentage of income paid by the student,  
(4)  The collection mechanism,  




(1)  Income-contingent loans (ICLs), like HCCs and the graduate tax, 
decrease the risk for the student in terms of their earnings- net-of-
education-payments. 
(2)  ICLs also satisfy a concept of fairness based on dynamic equity, 
since students end up paying less than the value of the loan only 
if they end up with low incomes during the repayment period. 
(3)  Another advantage ICLs have is the lack of a strong adverse 
selection problem. Students who see in themselves high future 
incomes will not have an unlimited liability and will not have a 




ICLs share with HCCs and the graduate tax some common weaknesses and 
obstacles to implementation. They require the measurement of income, are  
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subject to some adverse selection and distort the labor market, though to a 




(1)  Traditional mortgage-type loans can be a simple solution for 
financing education, but do not seem to be effective. 
(2)  Human Capital Contracts represent an alternative that addresses 
the most important concerns regarding traditional ￿mortgage-
type￿ loans. HCCs decrease risk for the student, compensate 
investors for risk by offering upside potential, and offer 
information to the market regarding information on the expected 
value of education. 
(3)  The graduate tax, like HCCs, also addresses some of the problems 
of traditional loans. It can be universally applied and students will 
not  have  the  burden  of  an  inflexible  debt.  However,  there  are 
other features that make them less attractive than HCCs. 
(4)  Income-contingent loans decrease risk for the student, have 
attracted private capital in the past, and do not have the negative 
incentives present in Human Capital Contracts and the graduate 
tax. Their only particular disadvantage, when contrasted against 
Human Capital Contracts, is that they do not offer information to 
the market regarding the expected value of education. 
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Government Subsidization Alternatives 
 
These  are  the  alternatives  for  financing  education  that  are  used  to 
implement  government  subsidization  of  education.  These  schemes  are 
concerned with the mechanisms available to policymakers to provide aid 
for education. The main methods considered here are:  
(1)  Public funding of educational institutions and  
(2)  Vouchers and voucher- like instruments. As is the case with cost 
recovery  schemes,  the  methods  for  subsidizing  education  are 
usually combined. 
 
Public Funding of Educational Institutions 
 
Under  this  arrangement  government  owns  and  funds  educational 
institutions.  Transfers  are  negotiated  directly  between  government  and 
institutions to cover educational expenses. 
 
The  lack  of  responsiveness  of  institutions  to  the  needs  of  students  and 
labor  markets  are  the  result  of  the  existing  incentives.  The  primary 
constituency of school administrators is not the student body, or the labor 
market, but the agencies in government responsible for giving schools the 
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For lifelong learning in particular, there are two additional arguments 
against public provision of education: 
 
 First,  because  there  is  a  wide  and  complex  variety  of  fields  for 
training,  the  effort  that  centralized  public  agencies  would  have  to 
make  to  align  services  offered  with  market  demand  is  far  more 
complicated than in higher-education. 
 Second, embracing lifelong learning requires accepting informal 
education mechanisms, such as on-the-job training, which are hard 
to model in the context of a public education institution. 
 
Even though public funding of higher and other noncompulsory education 
will continue for a time, a complete solution for financing lifelong learning 
does not lie in public funding. The attention has gradually shifted towards 




The basic idea behind a voucher is to give the resources to students so 
that they can go and enroll in the educational institution of their choice. 
This is the essence of demand-side financing. 
The main policy considerations when designing voucher programs are: 
 
1)Voucher amount: How much will be given to each student? Will it 
depend on the school the individual attends or on the field of study 
pursued? Will it be proportional to tax payments? To training cost? To 
students who save? To income? Other variables?   29
 
2) Student spending limit: Is the voucher supposed to cover the whole cost 
of education, or can the student add to the voucher value to pay for 
tuition? Can the voucher be used for other costs, such as transportation?  
 
3) Voucher target: Will the voucher be given to everybody? Only students 
from particular income backgrounds? To particular schools? 
Voucher use: For what kind of education are vouchers going to be used? 




1. a subsidy that increase consumer sovereignty, thereby increasing 
efficiency in the education market, and  
2. Vouchers can be used to target particular social groups, thus 




1. As with any source of public aid, the administration of a voucher 
program requires controls in order to prevent their misuse. 
2. An obstacle to implementation is the way public opinion and legal 
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Conclusion 
 
1. Vouchers  enhance  efficiency  in  the  education  market  and  can  be 
used  to  promote  equitable  access  to  education,  making  them  a 
preferable  alternative  to  the  direct  transfer  of  public  funds  to 
educational institutions. 
2. Their design can be quite complex and entails an important political 
effort, and their execution requires control systems to ensure that 
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Design and implementation of lifelong learning policies. 
 
We now conclude with a short guide on key elements that government 
should consider when embarking on the design and implementation of 




The  model  that  best  addresses  the  financing  of  lifelong  learning  is  a 
voucher program in combination with income contingent loans and Human 
Capital  Contracts.  Such  a  combination  addresses  equity  concerns,  both 
from a static and dynamic point of view, and promotes efficiency in the 
labor  and  education  markets.  In  line  with  the  objectives  of  lifelong 
learning, entitlements should be available for a wide variety of skills, should 
promote  saving,  and  should  promote  spreading  learning  throughout  the 
productive life of the individual. 
 
The Role of the Jamaican Government 
 
The way that the Jamaican government faces the problem of financing 
lifelong learning will result in consequences that affect an important part of 
the population. Following is an important set of challenges that the 
government of Jamaica will face in order to create a suitable system for 
financing lifelong learning: 
1) Shifting towards cost-recovery policies: A sustainable, efficient 
and equitable system for financing lifelong learning requires a 
cost-recovery mechanism. Implementing such a mechanism can   32
be a challenge given the tradition of free state- funded 
education. 
2) Focusing  on  collection  of  payments:  The  success  of  cost-
recovery  policies  will  depend  on  the  success  in  collecting 
payments  from  former  students.  The  participation  of  tax-
collection agencies or social security systems is a possibility that 
should be considered. 
3) Involving private capital: A substantial increase in the amount 
of  resources  available  for  financing  education,  particularly  for 
lifelong learning, is not feasible without the intervention of the 
private  sector.  Attracting  private  capital  will  probably  require 
commitment  to  honor  agreements,  guarantees  from 
governments,  aid  in  collecting  payments,  and  decisions  by 
private  parties  on  the  particular  characteristics  of  each 
instrument offered. 
4) Designing  voucher-like  systems:  A  complete  scheme  for 
financing lifelong learning requires subsidies from government. 
Following  the  above  discussion,  these  should  ideally  be 
voucher-  like  systems.  Government  needs to make a political 
decision  to  support  these  systems.  Particularly  for  financing 
lifelong learning, a decision has to be made to make vouchers 
available to the population for different types of training and for 
the  period  in  life  that  the  individual  chooses  to  attain  more 
knowledge.  Vouchers  can  be  made  available  at  any  given 
moment, or after the individual has saved for learning. Finally, 
vouchers  should  also  be  targeted  to  particular  marginalized 
socioeconomic groups. 
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5) Providing Information: An important feature that contributes to 
making  the  education  market  more  efficient  is  the  compiling 
and  distribution  of  information  regarding  the  quality  of 
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